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Remarks Joseph A. Grundfest
November of 1986 marked a turning point in the politics of the takeover
debate. In the space of ten days, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission announced settlement of the Ivan Boesky insider trading case'
and the Democrats gained control of the U.S. Senate. Either event
alone would have altered the context of the takeover debate. The com-
bination of the two in such a short period of time, however, added a
sense of urgency to the legislative desire to "do something—do any-
thing" about takeovers.
In these remarks I will first discuss the relationship between take-
overs and insider trading and explain the illogic of the argument that
hostile takeovers should be curbed in order to stop insider trading. I
then criticize recently introduced antitakeover legislation that does
nothing to prevent allegedly egregious defensive tactics, while at the
same time imposing overbroad burdens on stock acquisitions that could
adversely affect many transactions wholly unrelated to hostile takeovers.
The Link between Insider Trading and Takeovers
Many takeover critics have tried to link insider trading with hostile
takeovers. They argue that hostile takeovers should be curbed so that
insider trading can be stopped. This argument is, however, seriously
misguided.
Insider trading occurs when someone misappropriates or, through
breach of a duty, converts valuable nonpublic information about a
pending transaction or disclosure.2 Thus, insider trading can occur
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when a friendly merger is pending,3 when a company has found a If
substantial mineral deposit,4 or when unfavorable earnings have not as gres
yet been announced.5 Hostile takeovers are not uniquely susceptible not.
to insider trading, nor do hostile takeovers cause insider trading in any mis1
meaningful sense—just as mineral finds, earnings reports, and friendly side
takeovers in and of themselves do not cause insider trading. Indeed,
efforts to prohibit hostile takeovers in order to deter insider trading
make as little sense as efforts to stop vote fraud by cancelling all fror
elections, or efforts to stop bank robbery by shutting down all banks, app
Unfortunately, the recently introduced antitakeover legislation falls dud
prey to easy but illogical arguments that seek to prevent insider trading ers
by stopping takeovers. For example, a statement accompanying S. 1323, Un
the "Tender Offer Disclosure and Fairness Act," attacks the "market Siej
• manipulating corporate raider" and cites trading by Dennis Levine, as
Martin Siegel, and Ivan Boesky as examples of the abuses engendered tra(
by "manipulative raids."6 The problem with this attack on insider trad- as I
ing,which makes a great deal of sense as an introduction to a legislative thr(
definition of insider trading, is that it makes no sense as a rationale for S
legislation targeting takeover activity.7 are
Insider trading is not caused by hostile takeovers, nor is it uniquely por
associated with hostile takeovers. To make this point crystal clear, fori
consider the Nestle-Carnation deal, a notorious example of insider
trading that involved Messrs. Boesky and Siegel and netted Boesky tak
profits of $28.3 million.8 In the Carnation trade, Siegel was Carnation's tra(
investment banker and participated in extensive friendly negotiations
that both Carnation and Nestle sought to keep secret.9 There were no duff
hostile bids involved, and no raiders were trying to impose their will apç
on Carnation's management. Nonetheless, Siegel tipped Boesky about
the friendly deal, and the transaction gave rise to a stunning volume Tal
of insider trading. (
The Carnation trade demonstrates that friendly deals are every bit als
as susceptible to insider trading as hostile ones. In fact, a recent study dis
by the Securities and Exchange Commission's Office of the Chief Econ- a n
omist found substantial evidence of stock price runups before the an- tec
nouncement of friendly transactions.'° It also found that runups before tak
friendly deals were more pronounced than runups before hostile trans- bill
actions." This finding suggests—but certainly does not establish—that fen
insider trading may be more pronounced in friendly deals than in hostile
deals. Friendly deals may be more susceptible to insider trading be- hol
cause more people on both sides of the negotiations are likely to know acq
of the pending deal for a longer period of time. In contrast, a hostile
bidder wants to avoid tipping a target that a bid is forthcoming. The is C
hostilebidder is therefore likely to move faster with fewer people reg
knowing of the bid, and is more likely to be able to maintain secrecy. act313 Panel Discussion: Corporate Takeovers and Public Policy
a If friendly deals are more susceptible to insider trading, should Con-
as gress stop friendly deals in order to stop insider trading? Of course
le not. Similarly, Congress should not constrain hostile takeovers on the
fly misguided rationale that those deals are particularly susceptible to in-
sider trading.
d, In fact, even in cases where insider trading is discovered in connec-
ng tion with a hostile takeover, the trading does not necessarily emanate
all from the bidder's camp, nor does it necessarily occur with the bidder's
:s. approval. For example, the U.S. Attorney's Office has alleged that
us during Mesa's hostile bid for Unocal one of Unocal's investment bank-
ng ers tipped Mr. Siegel about Unocal's planned defensive maneuvers.'2
Unocal's defensive tactic caused the value of its shares to decline, and
:et Siegel caused his employer to buy put options that increased in value
as a result of the Unocal price decrease. But to blame this insider
ed trading on the raider's conduct is obviously wrong and makes about
as much sense as blaming .pass interference on the quarterback who
ye throws the football.
'or Strong rules against theft of information in the form of insider trading
are sound public policy, and I support vigorous efforts to protect cor-
porations' and stockholders' property rights in confidential market in-
ar, formation.'3 The link between hostile takeovers and insider trading,
ler however, is largely a public relations device used by opponents of
ky takeovers with little regard to the logic of their arguments. Insider
trading cannot and should not serve as a rationale for imposing re-
ns straints on takeover activity. Insider trading and takeovers are two
no different issues that call for distinct analyses and distinct legislative
,ill approaches.
Takeover Legislation
On the legislative front the Senate Democrats' antitakeover propos-
bit als introduced in the first six months of 1987 have suffered from a
dy disappointing gap between rhetoric and reality. The rhetoric speaks of
a need to control both coercive bidder tactics and abusive defensive
fl- techniqueswithout forgoing the benefits that result from an active
re takeover market. The legislative reality, however, is that some of these
is- bills would do essentially nothing to control the allegedly abusive de-
lat fensive techniques they claim to address. They would also impose
ile substantial burdens on anyone seeking to acquire a significant stock-
holding position in a publicly traded corporation, even if the share
acquisition was wholly unrelated to a hostile takeover.
ile Whatever the rhetoric the message of much of the legislative language
he is clear: The legislation is designed to stifle takeover activity with little
)le regard to the costs imposed on a broad range of nontakeover trans-
actions. The legislation also seeks to tilt the balance in takeover contestsr
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strongly in favor of the incumbent management because the bills contain the
no meaningful effort to control abusive defensive tactics. Accordingly, gre(
even if one is opposed to egregious and abusive takeover tactics and an j
believes federal legislation is appropriate, it would be easy to oppose a k
much of the legislation pending before the Senate in 1987. ma
Take the example of S. 1323, the "Tender Offer Disclosure and Fair- gre
ness Act," sponsored by Senator William Proxmire and cosponsored pre
by all eight Democrats on the Securities Subcommittee of the Banking por
Committee. The statement accompanying S. 1323 explains that "tender sto
offers themselves should be neither encouraged nor discouraged by 1
law; egregious defenses as well as coercive takeover tactics should be Ins
limited."4 Bravo! As a guide for responsible takeover legislation, this trai
formula could hardly be crafted in a more workable and evenhanded of
way. tra
Nevertheless, by oversight or calculation, somewhere between the nec
fine rhetoric and the serious work of legislative drafting, something has
gone wrong because the bill does essentially nothing to limit "egregious tha
defenses"; restricts a broad range of market transactions that have thai
nothing to do with "coercive takeover tactics"; and seeks to discourage
by law the very transactions toward which the statement proclaims Go
neutrality, pro
Toothless controls on "egregious defenses?"
The..authors of the bill have identified greenmail, golden parachutes, to
and poison pills as defensive practices that they consider egregious. als
Assuming for the moment that these practices warrant federal regu- poi
lation—a conclusion I do not embrace—it would make sense to draft off
legislation that effectively addresses the problems caused by such the
"egregious defenses." The proposed legislation is, however, toothless tici
when it comes to regulating greenmail, golden parachutes, and poison
pills. Indeed, the remarkably ineffective nature of the provisions in- Po
tended to regulate these three practices unfortunately calls into ques- poI
tion the willingness of the bill's authors to control takeover defenses pui
that are purportedly egregious. pei
no
Greenmail. In particular, S. 1323 does not prohibit greenmail.Instead, off
it attempts to control the price at which greenmail can be paid. It does res
so, by establishing a maximum repurchase price equal to the average in
price over the 30 days preceding the greenmail transaction. This price I.
control provision will be ineffective whenever the average price over no
a trailing 30-day period is greater than the prevailing market price
because, under those circumstances, greenmail can be paid at a price of
higher than the price prevailing at the time of the repurchase.'6 Thus, in
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am the antigreenmail provision of S. 1323 may paradoxically lead to higher
greenmail payments. Moreover, because some individuals may have
Lnd an interest in creating a higher 30-day average price in order to support
)se a larger greenmail payment, the danger exists that some individuals
may attempt to manipulate stock prices to take advantage of such a
air- greenmail price control rule. Under no circumstances would the rule
prevent a large stockholder from selling his shares back to the cor-
ing poration for a premium price unavailable to other, typically smaller
icr stockholders.
by The proposed legislation would therefore do little to deter greenmail.
be Instead, if enactment of the bill is construed as federal approval of
his transactions that comply with its toothless price control rule, passage
led of the legislation could actually increase the incidence of greenmail
transactions. A similar pattern has, in the past, been observed in con-
the nection with the tax treatment of golden parachutes: Once Congress
ias established a special tax applicable only to golden parachutes that more
us than trebled an executive's compensation,'7 a rule of thumb emerged
we that parachutes that no more than trebled compensation were acceptable.
ige
ms Goldenparachutes.The golden parachute provision in S. 1323 would
prohibit a company from adopting a golden parachute only while a
tender offer is pending.'8 But at least 198 of the Fortune 500 firms
already have such plans in place,'9 and the legislation would do nothing
es, to control these existing parachutes. The proposed legislation would
us. also do nothing to deter corporations from adopting parachutes at any
gu- point in the future—provided the paperwork is signed before the tender
raft offer begins. Thus, the bill would again be toothless, this time regarding
ich the hundreds of parachutes that have already been strapped on in an-
ess ticipation of takeover battles.
son
in- Poison pills. The poison pill provision of S. 1323 would prohibit only
es- poison pills adopted while a tender offer is pending.2° More than 400
ses publicly traded corporations have already adopted poison pills.21 The
pending legislation would not affect the existing pills and would do
nothing to prevent the adoption of future poison pills before a tender
ad, offer is announced. Thus, this legislative proposal is toothless with
oes respect to the hundreds of poison pill plans that have already been put
age in place.
ice Leading takeover counsel have advised clients to adopt poison pills
ver now, so that they will be prepared in the event the bill becomes law.22
ice Paradoxically, if companies accept this advice, the simple introduction
ice of S. 1323 will have increased the number of "egregious" poison pills
us, in place.
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Antitakeover provisions. The provisions targeting "egregious de- sen
fenses" are all bark and no bite. Are the provisions aimed at potential of 2
hostile bids equally inept? Hardly. The antibidder provisions are so tiflc
broad and overinclusive that I have neither the time nor space to de- sha
scribe even a fraction of them. Instead, I will describe only one set of eve
provisions with potential consequences that are particularly overbroad. Con
If enacted, these provisions could radically change the structure of the fort
entire stock market and influence thousands of transactions that have in
nothing to do with hostile takeovers. Ii
S. 1323 would prohibit anyone from acquiring more than 15 percent
of a company's shares unless the acquisition is made through a tender fair
offer.23 Combined with a provision in S. 1324 that prohibits partial thai
tenders by requiring that tender offers for more than 20 percent of a an
company's shares be for all the company's shares,24 the legislation to
would effectively prevent anyone from acquiring more than 20 percent I
of a company unless he tendered for the entire company.25 intr
The consequences of this regislation could radically restructure large trin
portions of the securities market that are unrelated to hostile takeovers, one
As an example of the reach of these provisions, consider the following
illustrations of transactions that would be forbidden. liab
Suppose a large pharmaceutical company wants to acquire 30 percent tex
of a smaller, biotechnology firm's shares in conjunction with a license gre
or joint venture. The bidder will be prohibited from making that in- civ
vestment unless it tenders for all of the biotech company's shares. alle
Thus, the legislation could force the smaller company out of existence
as part of the price of obtaining equity capital. Is t
Suppose a company's founder wants to bequeath his 60 percent I
holding to an only child. The founder could not do so unless the child up
tendered for the entire company. No
If an investor wants to provide additional equity capital to a company as
in which she already owns 20 percent, she would be forbidden from wo
doing so unless she offered to buy the entire firm. Indeed, any investor isI
already holding a 20 percent position who simply wants to increase an tra
existing position would be forbidden from doing so unless the investor ing
makes a tender offer for the entire company. (
Viewed from the seller's perspective, the situation is potentially even tak
more far-reaching because any seller who owns 20 percent or more of De
a company's shares would be unable to dispose of those shares in a
single block unless the purchaser agreed to conduct a tender offer for No
all the company's shares. The block would therefore have to be broken





Thereach of these provisions obviously stretches far beyond any mat
rational concern over hostile takeovers. Because the legislation would issu317 Panel Discussion: Corporate Takeovers and Public Policy
de- seriouslydeter any share acquisition that creates a holding in excess
of 20 percent, the legislation would, over time, cause the gradual cx-
so tinction of stockholder positions above 20 percent. Strong minority
de- shareholders are a valuable monitoring device in corporate governance,
of even if the minority shareholders never threaten a takeover or proxy
)ad. contest. The gradual extinction of these minority positions could there-
the fore change the balance of power between stockholders and managers
save in ways entirely unrelated to hostile takeovers.
In addition, it is no defense of the provisions to observe that the
SEC could craft exemptions "consistent with the purposes and policy
ider fairly intended" by the legislation.26 It is a foolish bill, so overbroad
rtial that its authors would require an administrative agency to construct
of a an armada of exemptions merely to allow garden-variety transactions
tion to continue undeterred.
;ent These constraints should be evaluated in conjunction with efforts to
introduce an unworkable extension of the "conscious parallelism" doc-
trge trifle from antitrust law to the takeover arena; impose on shareholders
ers. onerous disclosure requirements unrelated to takeover activity; and
ving create sweeping extensions of private rights of action and theories of
liability that invite for extensive litigation and strike suits. In this con-
:ent text it quickly becomes clear that the proposed legislation places far
greater burdens on bidders, who may be doing nothing unfair or coer-
cive, than on targeted companies responding to takeover attempts with
res. allegedly "egregious" defenses
nce
Is the Legislation Balanced?
By no stretch of the imagination does the proposed legislation live
hild up to its promise neither to encourage nor discourage tender offers.
Nor does the legislation live up to its promise to limit egregious defenses
any as well as coercive takeover tactics. Instead, the proposed legislation
rom would seriously deter takeovers without regard to whether the takeover
stor is fair and noncoercive; place impediments in the path of innocent
an transactions wholly unrelated to hostile deals; and do essentially noth-
stor ing to deter "egregious defenses."
Obviously, even if one believes that something should be done about
yen takeover activity, legislation of the sort supported by many Senate
e of Democrats is not a reasonable approach to the takeover problem.
in a
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Remarks Gregg Jan-eli Aitho
antttake
John Shad, the outgoing chairman of the Securities and Exchange Corn- Sioflary
mission, and his enforcement chief, Gary Lynch, have engineered a
remarkable crackdown on insider trading on Wall Street. Dennis Levine sharehc
pleaded guilty and agreed to pay a $12 million penalty; Ivan Boesky th
turned over $100 million and continues to cooperate with the SEC's a rule
investigation; and several other major Wall Street figures have since preme
been arrested. Recently, John Shad promised several more major toprey
dictments would be forthcoming in the near future. These earth-shat- But t
tering scandals have precipitated numerous Congressional hearings on of Conj
insider trading and other abuses stemming from the record mergers on the
and acquisitions activity of recent years. It seems these cases will latory r
provide the political momentum necessary for antitakeover lobbyists Picken
to accomplish what the Reagan administration has thwarted until now: if yot
major new legislation designed to deter hostile takeover attempts. of regi
The new legislative proposals contain major changes in tender offer takeov
rules, such as increasing the "cooling off" period for offers from the new Ia
existing rule of 20 business days to 60 business days. This proposal mutual
vividly exposes that the true legislative motivation is to chill takeovers, corpor
not to reduce the incidence of insider trading. After all, does anyone
seriously believe that tripling the minimum offer period to three months
will reduce the opportunities for insider trading?
Before the Wall Street scandals, which can be dated with the 14 D
November1986 announcement of Boesky's settlement, the intensive
lobbying efforts by big business to achieve legislation conferring "veto
power" over hostile had yielded few results. These lobbyists I
(including the Business Roundtable and other spokespersons for top
management of large public firms) have been alarmed by the changes antitr
in the takeover market that have made America's once untouchable, out th
large public firms vulnerable to hostile takeover bids. These changes then
include the pro-merger attitude taken by President Reagan's antitrust mergi
enforcers; the 1982 Supreme Court ruling striking down first-generation Me
state antitakeover laws; the deregulation of oil and gas, transportation, Depa
securities and banking, and other industries; and the neutral stance Unde
toward takeover combatants taken by the SEC under Reagan. These propc
developments together have fueled a surge in merger and acquisition acqut
activity, and financial innovations have made hostile bids for large firms repor
quite feasible for those willing to pay the requisite premiums over of
market price. agenc
withd
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Althoughstate courts have provided some rulings favorable to the
antitakeover forces—such as the Unocal decision upholding the exclu-
sionary self-tender offer and the Household decision upholding man-
a agement's unilateral adoption of the poison pill defense without obtaining
e shareholder voting approval—these decisions have been qualified to
yin limit their usefulness as devices for deterrence. The SEC recently passed
a rule making exclusionary tender offers illegal, and the Delaware su-
nce preme court, while legalizing poison pills, prescribed strict standards
r in- to prevent pills from being used to entrench incumbent managements.
'hat- But the Wall Street scandals, together with the Democrats' takeover
on of Congress in 1986 and the corrosive effects of the Iran-contra scandal
ers on the resolve of the Reagan administration, create a recipe for regu-
till latory reform. It is truly open season on corporate raiders. Even Boone
ists Pickens, through his United Shareholders Association, has adopted an
"if you can't beat them join them" attitude and proposed a long list
of regulatory initiatives, although they are decidedly less hostile to
offer takeover specialists than the Congressional version. Although these
the new laws will prove costly to the mass of individual shareholders and
osal mutual fund holders, the narrow but powerful political interests of top
'ers corporate management and various lobbyists will be the primary voices
helping to craft the new laws.
nths
Remarks Steven C. Salop
I have been charged with discussing the implications for competition
top policy of the papers in this volume, in particular, their implications for
nges antitrust policy governing mergers and acquisitions. I will briefly set
ible out the regulatory environment governing mergers and acquisitions and
nge then discuss the possible influence of the findings in this volume on
trust merger policy.
Ltion Merger policy in the United States is carried out mainly by the
tion Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Pre-Merger Notification Act of 1976, all
hese proposed acquisitions of assets valued in excess of $15 million by an
ition acquiring firm with assets or sales in excess of $100 million must be
irms reported to the agencies. A merger cannot be consummated until one
over of the agencies has evaluated its likely effects on competition. If the
agency finds a problem of competition, the merging parties can either
withdraw the proposal, negotiate a method of alleviating the agency's
Inc.,
Steven C. Salop is professor of economics at the Georgetown University Law Center..'
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concern (for example, by selling off a plant or an entire division), or
litigate the issue. Very few cases are litigated. Over the years 1982—86 tratio1
the FTC and DOJ brought enforcement actions against only 56ofthe savint
more than 7,700 mergers reported.' ers
Mergers are evaluated under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. A merger
is illegal if it "substantially decreases competition or tends to create a will in
monopoly." Three concepts of competition may be relevant for merger Thi:
policy. Jiistjc
First, to economists, this language concerns market power, the ability
Al of firms in a market to restrain output and thereby raise price above anti
the competitive level, as defined by marginal cost. Mergers, especially met
mergers among competitors, may reduce competition in this regard by cap
facilitating the exercise of market power. cha
Second, to economists, competition may concern the production avo
efficiency of firms in the economy. Mergers and acquisitions, whether that
by competitors or by firms in separate markets, may help the merging
The C firms reduce costs.
Third, to some noneconomists (possibly including the Congressmen Son
who drafted and amended Section 7), competition concerns more than be
economists' definition of market power. Competition also concerns the
social and political implications of concentration of assets or production
among the largest firms in the economy as well as the ability of small
en,
businesses to remain viable in the economy. According to this concept Thi
of competition, acquisitions by large corporations can increase aggre- for ai
gate concentration, as measured by the share of assets held by the 200 be ret
or 500 largest corporations.2 merg
These three concepts of competition have different implications for to th
merger policy. The first definition would suggest that merger policy willI
should focus primarily on "horizontal" mergers (mergers among com- magn
petitors), and to a lesser extent on "vertical" mergers (mergers be- from
tween suppliers and customers), where the former raise credible deteri
allegations of anticompetitive exclusion. In contrast to the third defi- Tht
nition, this view of competition would not be concerned at all with of the
"conglomerate" mergers (mergers among firms that are neither actual on thi
nor potential competitors and that do not stand in a vertical relationship searci
to each other). The third definition also may conflict with the second, both
as in the case of an acquisition by a large competitor. Whereas the effici
second definition would applaud such a merger, this acquisition also sistan
may reduce the ability of smaller, less efficient firms to compete, thereby again:
offending the third definition.3 Un
The current antitrust authorities focus on the first and second defi- little
nitions of competition. They are not at all concerned with aggregate not th
concentration. All conglomerate mergers are permitted. Merger policy petito
js concerned only with market power and, as a result, focuses almost the e323 Panel Discussion: Corporate Takeovers and Public Policy
i)or exclusively on horizontal mergers. Throughout the Reagan adminis-
2—86 tration years only one or two vertical mergers have been blocked. Cost
f the savings and other increases in production efficiency flowing from merg-
ers now are viewed as reasons to allow the mergers, not the opposite.
erger Formally, these arguments serve as defenses to allegations that a merger
ate a will increase market power.
erger This view of efficiency benefits is stated in the 1984 Department of
Justice Merger Guidelines, the bible ofmerger enforcement, as follows:
bility Although they sometimes harm competition, mergers generally play
bove an important role in a free enterprise economy. They can penalize
ineffective management and facilitate the efficient flow of investment
rd by capital and the redeployment of existing productive assets. While
challenging competitively harmful mergers, the Department seeks to
ction avoid unnecessary interference with the larger universe of mergers
ether that are either competitively beneficial or competitively neutral.
rging The Guidelines relate this statement to efficiency as follows:
Some mergers that the Department otherwise might challenge may
than be necessary to achieve significant efficiencies. If the parties
establish...thata merger will achieve such efficiencies, the De- s. partment will consider those efficiencies in deciding whether to chal-
ction lenge the merger.
small
tcept This view of antitrust is important in understanding the relevance
ggre- for antitrust policy of the papers in this volume. First, the papers will
e 200 be relevant only if they concern horizontal or vertical mergers. These
mergers are a fairly small fraction of the mergers reported each year
[S for to the antitrust enforcement agencies. Second, their main relevance
olicy will be to gauge either the likely increase in market power or the
corn- magnitude of cost savings and other efficiencies that could be expected
s be- from the representative mergers and to characterize more precisely the
dible determinants of these variables for any particular merger.
defi- The impact of mergers on market power is not a particular concern
with of the papers in this volume. Several of the papers do, however, focus
,ctual on the potential efficiency benefits of mergers. The Hall paper on re-
riship search and development and the Brown and Medoff paper on labor
ond, both study potential efficiency effects. By gauging the likely (average)
s the efficiency benefits of the average merger, these papers can be of as-
also sistance to policy makers engaged in balancing efficiency concerns
against likely increases in market power.
Unfortunately, these two papers, at least in their present form, have
defi- little direct application to antitrust policy. First, because antitrust was
not their focus, they do not distinguish between mergers among corn-
'olicy petitors and other kinds of mergers. We therefore cannot tell whether
most the effects uncovered would apply to horizontal mergers. Second,324J. A. Grundfest, G. Jarrell, S. C. Salop, and 1.J. White 32S
because the sample of horizontal mergers is so small, efficiency effects
for this subsample may be statistically insignificant.
Other papers that examined the motives for merger may have more the
significant implications for antitrust policy, even in their present form. of co
As stated above, antitrust policy presumes that mergers generally are
either neutral or motivated by concerns for efficiency. Several of the
N papers raised questions about this presumption.
Ole
For example, the Guidelines quoted above suggest that mergers cre-
ate efficiency benefits by penalizing ineffective management. In prin-
ciple, the enforcement thresholds governing market power were set to in
trade off these benefits optimally against market power concerns. If it signjf
were shown that mergers do not have significant managerial control
benefits, it would follow that the optimal enforcement thresholds should 2.
1
betightened. this v
In this regard, the Shleifer and Summers paper has important im-
plications for merger enforcement. The authors show that the fact that biock
firms are acquired at a premium over current stock market value should
not create a presumption that the acquisition increases efficiency or
social wealth. Instead, the premium may reflect nothing more than the Rei
opportunistic transfer of quasi-rents to the acquirer. In acquisitions in
which this transfer is significant, there is no efficiency justification for In th
tolerating even small increases in the likelihood of market power.
Shleifer and Summers also raise questions whether antitrust author- econ
ities should view attempts to block mergers by incumbent managers who
and rivals as good signals that the acquisition actually would enhance and
efficiency and competition. Rivals may legitimately fear that the ac-
quisition would raise their own labor costs by creating a fear in their ation
existing workers that they also will breach their implicit contracts. finan
Incumbent managers may be protecting these contracts in order to
minimize long-run costs, not to protect their own jobs. Anti
The Auerbach and Reishus paper raises similar questions with re- An
spect to the tax benefits of mergers. The private benefits from reducing 7 oft
taxes exceed the social benefits or may have no social benefits at all. the 1
Thus, mergers motivated by tax savings do not create efficiencies that line
justify increases in market power. This paper finds that tax consider- acqui
ations generally are unimportant, in the sense that they do not explain creat
which mergers take place. Unfortunately, this is not the main issue for menti
antitrust policy. There seldom is a choice of merger partners.
For antitrust analysis, the more salient question would be the effect that
of tax considerations on the aggregate level of merger activity. This vislo
issue is addressed by the Golbe and White paper. Here the authors find to pr
no effects from the different tax regimes. To the extent that this finding
suggests tax considerations are unimportant, acquisition premiums are Law
more likely to reflect efficiency (or market power) benefits. of ecol325 Panel Discussion: Corporate Takeovers and Public Policy
rects In short, the papers in this volume were not geared to antitrust policy
considerations and, therefore, have few direct implications. Perhaps
nore the authors might focus in their next round of research on the issues
orm. of concern to competition policy planners.
,'are
f the Notes
I. See Antitrust and Trade Regulation Reporter, vol. 52, 5 March 1987, 452.
cre- Privateparties (customers, suppliers, or competitors) and states also can sue
pnn- to block a proposed merger. Because of the federal government's primary role
et to in the process, however, private and state litigation has generally had little
If it significance. But this is changing now that the government has so relaxed its
ntrol merger enforcement. More cases are being brought, often successfully.
2. For trends in aggregate concentration, see the Golbe and White paper in
LOUiu thisvolume.
3. For example, in the Brown Shoe case (370 U.S. 294 (1962)), the Supreme




n the Remarks Lawrence J. White
ns in
n for In this brief set of remarks I will offer two public policy perspectives
on the merger and acquisition process: first, that of a former chief
thor- economist of the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice
agers who was one of the authors of the division's 1982 Merger Guidelines;
ance and, second, that of a current member of the Federal Home Loan Bank
e ac- Board, which regulates most of the nation's savings and loan associ-




:h re- Antitrust policy on mergers rests for its legal foundation on Section
ucing 7 of the Clayton Act. That act instructs the Department of Justice and
tt all. the Federal Trade Commission to halt those mergers "where in any
line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
3lder- acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
plain create a monopoly."2 It is worth noting that the Clayton Act makes no
ie for mention of size or of aggregate concentration across the entire economy.
In 1982 the Antitrust Division issued a set of "Merger Guidelines"
effect that were designed to formalize the paradigm and procedures the di-
This vision would follow in deciding whether to challenge a merger and also
s find to provide this information to private antitrust attorneys, so that they
nding
is are Lawrence J. White is a member of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and professor
of economics at the Graduate School of Business Administration, New York University.
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could better guide and advise their clients. These Guidelines repre-
sented a complete revamping of an earlier (1968) set of merger guide- war
lines. In 1984 the division modified the Guidelines modestly. (Unless seilt
otherwise indicated, the discussion below will refer to the 1982 version.) not
The conceptual basis underlying the Guidelines is a concern that
mergers may create or enhance market power. At the heart of the pro'
Guidelines is the belief, in the tradition of Chamberlin (1933), Fellner in ti
(1949), and Stigler (1964), that oligopolists in markets where entry is sorn
not easy are likely to behave in a noncompetitive fashion, but
The Guidelines first provide a paradigm for defining a relevant market stre
for the purposes of judging a given merger.3 Since the purpose of the A
antitrust merger limitation is to prevent the significant creation of or tion
increase in market power, markets are defined in terms of the ability witi
of firms, if they act in concert, to exercise significant market power. test
In essence, the Guidelines define a market as the smallest group of ers
sellers—defined across both product space and geographic space—that, will
if they acted in concert (that is, as a monopolist), could profitably raise cisi
prices by a "small but significant" amount for a "nontransitory" period I
of time.4 The Guidelines use a 5percentincrease over a one-year period the
as the crucial parameters in this paradigm. prio
Having delineated the market, the Guidelines then ask if any paired like
set of the merger partners' products are in the same market. If not, sho
the merger immediately passes muster and is unlikely to be challenged.5 ketr
If one or more pairs of products are in the market, however, further is,
examination is needed. are
The next focus of the Guidelines is the level of seller concentration disc
in the delineated market. The Guidelines use the Herfindahl-Hirschman F
index (HHI), according to which each seller's percentage of market eco
share is squared and summed. (The HHI of an atomistic market would offs
approach zero; that of a pure monopolist would be 10,000.) Two HHI 198
cutoff points are specified: If a market's postmerger HHI is below the
1,000, a merger will ordinarily not be challenged; if the HHI is above of s
1,800 (and the increase in the HHI that results from the merger is 100 1
points or greater), the merger will usually be challenged, unless there Gui
are extenuating circumstances, such as easy entry (discussed below). A
If the HHI falls between these two cutoffs, further investigation is nun
warranted, and a challenge may be forthcoming. (For readers who are mdi
more comfortable with the four-firm concentration ratio as a measure map
of seller concentration, it is worth noting that an HHI level of I ,000
corresponds empirically to a CR4 of approximately 50 percent; an HHI owi
of 1,800 corresponds to a CR4 of approximately 70 percent.) corn
Because conditions of easy entry would undermine the ability of poit
even an apparent monopolist to act noncompetitively, the Guidelines' strir327 Panel Discussion: Corporate Takeovers and Public Policy
re- primary attention to seller concentration. may seem somewhat back-
ide- ward in focus. The reason for this primacy, however, is that levels of
less seller concentration are easily quantified, whereas entry conditions are
)n) not easily quantified. The HHI levels do indicate some clear dividing
hat lines (after the market boundaries have been delineated) and thereby
the provide some "safe harbors" and "clearly treacherous" zones. Still,
ner in their preference for quantification, the Guidelines may be likened
y is somewhat to the drunk who loses his keys in the middle of the road
but then spends most of his time searching on the sidewalk under the
Street lamp "because the light is better there."
the After discussing seller concentration, the Guidelines turn to condi-
ror tions of entry. A high likelihood of significant entry into the market
lity within two years (in response to a 5percentprice increase) is the crucial
ver. test for whether entry conditions are easy and hence for whether merg-
of ers between firms in markets with high levels of seller concentration
iat, will not be challenged. Unfortunately, no further quantification or pre-
Lise cision is offered.
iod The Guidelines then move on to other market conditions, such as
iod the uniformity of product, level of buyer concentration, and history of
prior antitrust violations, that may yield some inferences as to the
red likelihood of noncompetitive behavior after merger. These conditions
iot, should be important in decisions whether to challenge mergers in mar-
kets with seller concentrations in the "further examination" range (that
her is, with an HHI of 1,000— 1,800). Again, these are considerations that
are solidly within the tradition of oligopoly theory. But, again, the
ion discussion of these elements offers no quantification or greater precision.
nan Finally, the Guidelines address the question whether the promised
ket economies of scale or other benefits of a merger should count as an
uld offset to the possible creation or enhancement of market power. The
IHI 1982 Guidelines took a highly skeptical stance toward these promises;
low the 1984 Guidelines indicate a greater willingness to accept economies
ove of scale as an offset.
100 These, then, are the major features of the current set of Merger
ere Guidelines. How have they been used?
w). Assessments of antitrust policy implementation frequently cite the
iis number of cases brought (the number of mergers challenged) as an
are indicator of stringency or leniency. This type of measure is largely
ure inappropriate, for two reasons. First, a case is likely to be brought only
000 when each of the litigating parties is sufficiently optimistic about its
[HI own chances of success, or about the stakes involved, so as to over-
come the expected costs of litigation.6 Another way of expressing this
of point is that the "location" of a legal standard (in terms of leniency or
les' stringency) is much less important for the volume of litigation than is328J.A. Grundfest, G. Jarrell, S. C. Salop, and L. J. White 329
the clarity or fuzziness of that standard and the differences of opinion Mei
among the litigants that may thereby arise. Second, in circumstances
in which a potentially offending merger can be "cured" by one of the
ba merger partners' spinning off a branch plant or a product division to
a third party buyer, this cure might be arranged through presuit or
for postsuit (but prejudgment) negotiations. The difference in method might
cha be more one of litigation style by antitrust enforcers than of substance,
and but the difference in suits brought could be sizable.
rei Accordingly, judgments about implementation must instead rest on
much more difficult assessments of the nature of those mergers that
pro go unchallenged and of where the border of challenge appears to be.
Nevertheless, my horseback judgment, along with that of virtually all
gen other observers, is that merger policy has been more lenient during the tho Reagan administration than it was before and has become still more
itor lenient in the administration's second term than it was in its first. This
greater leniency is probably a product of the somewhat greater leniency hyp that is built into the Guidelines themselves (as compared with the 1968
Guidelines) as well as the apparent tendency of the Reagan appointees tun to the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission increas-
ingly to interpret them in a lenient fashion.7 Even so, it is worth noting Ge,
thatantitrust policy on mergers has not been entirely dormant. In recent
years the FTC has successfully challenged the proposed mergers of
record producers Warner and Polygram and of soft drink producers tha
Coca-Cola and Dr Pepper, and the DOJ challenged the form of merger am
initially proposed for the steel producers Republic and LTV. In addition, ma
both agencies have challenged a number of mergers between smaller mo
and lesser known companies and have either stopped them or cured but
them through appropriate spin-offs. fro
It has sometimes been claimed that one of the elements contributing md
to the merger boom of the l980s has been the perceived leniency in losS
antitrust policy. I am unaware of any quantitative support for this claim, foli
and its validity seems highly dubious since most mergers do not appear for
to be among horizontal competitors and hence would not be challenged
under almost any antitrust standard of competition. Moreover, it is
worth invoking here Golbe and White's findings elsewhere in this vol-
ume. In their time-series analysis of merger activity, they use a dummy
variableto distinguish the time periods before and after January 1981. tha
The authors conceived that variable as one that might measure the
effects of the major tax changes of that year, but it might equally well mo
capture the effects of the soon-to-follow changes in antitrust policy. bar
Regardless of interpretation, however, the coefficient on that variable
is consistently nonsignificant in a number of alternative model speci- wit
fications. Perceived antitrust leniency does not appear to be a significant De
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Lion Mergers in the Banking and Thrift Industries
ces The commercial banking and thrift (savings and loan and savings
the bank) industries have been, and are likely to continue to be, ones
to containing significant numbers of mergers in the 1980s. The reasons
or for the merger wave in these industries are fairly straightforward: the
•ght changed national economic environment in general of the late l970s
Ce, and early l980s; the more specific economic declines of the 1980s in regionsof the country that are highly dependent on energy, agriculture,
Ofl or natural resources; changes in telecommunications and information-
hat processing technologies and innovations in financial services markets,
be. such as the development of the secondary mortgage markets and the
all general trend toward "securitization" of assets that were previously
the thought to be unique and nontradable; and the deregulation of depos-
ore itory institutions that has occurred in the 1980s. All four of these rea-
his sons are specific examples of the changed economic circumstances
LCY hypotheses advanced by Golbe and White in their paper in this volume.
)68 I will treat each of the contributing reasons for the merger wave in
turn.
as-
ing General economic conditions. The relatively high inflation rates cx-
ent périenced by the U.S. economy in the late 1970s and early 1980s meant
of relatively high, and rising, nominal interest rates. For a thrift industry
ers that was accustomed to borrowing short (passbook savings accounts)
ger and lending long (30-year fixed-rate home mortgages), the rise in nom-
inal interest rates was disastrous. Caught with a portfolio of long-lived
icr mortgages that had been made in earlier years at lower interest rates,
but forced to pay higher rates on deposits to prevent those deposits
from fleeing elsewhere, the thrifts were in a severe bind. The overall
ing industry experienced losses in 1981 and 1982, and hundreds of money-
Ifl losing thrifts were merged out of existence: With their mortgage port-
m, folios largely "under water," they provided tempting purchase targets
for the stronger thrifts (or outside purchasers) that had the staying
ed power and were willing to bet on an eventual decline in nominal interest
iS rates.
0l-
flY Specific regional declines. The economic declines of the 1980s in regions
81. that are highly dependent on energy, agriculture, or natural resources
he have meant hard times for many of the financial institutions that lent
'eli money to businesses located in these areas. Significant numbers of
Cy. banks and thrifts, not all of them actually located in these areas, have
ble become insolvent from poor loans and investments in these regions,
CI- with mergers (frequently with financial assistance from the Federal
mt Deposit Insurance Corporation or the Federal Savings and Loan In-
surance Corporation) usually following. It is ironic that a number of330i. A. Grundlest,G. Jarrell, S.C. Salop, and L. J. White 331
thrifts, experiencing losses from the interest rate squeezes, saw in- for
vestments in the sunbelt region as the means of bailing themselves aw
out—with unfortunate consequences. tru
Technological change and innovation. Improved telecommunications
and data processing have made it easier to operate financial services Col
networksover large geographic areas. And the development of very in
thick secondary mortgage markets have brought new investors (for
example, pension funds and insurance companies) into mortgage fund-
ing and encouraged the expansion of mortgage bankers that originate No
and sell mortgages in the secondary markets rather than holding them
in a portfolio funded by deposits. These changed opportunities have (19
certainly encouraged some of the mergers in the banking and thrift 2
industries. res
mv
Deregulation.In response to the plight of the thrifts in the late l970s
and early 1980s and in partial response to the changed circumstances
of financial markets generally, the Congress passed the Depository 3
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the 198
Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982.8 These acts called for the phasing-out 4
of the Federal Reserve's Regulation Q(whichhad mandated the interest
rate ceilings that banks and thrifts could pay on most of their deposits);
authorized all thrifts to offer consumers interest-bearing checking ac- bu3
counts (negotiated order of withdrawal, or NOW, accounts); authorized 5'
banks and thrifts to offer adjustable rate mortgages; expanded the prc
authority of thrifts to engage in lending and investment outside of home
mortgages,including consumer, commercial, and agricultural loans and
7
direct equity investments; and eased restrictions on banks' and thrifts' pra
abilityto purchase other depository institutions across state lines, if 8
the purchased institutions were in financial difficulties. Simultaneously, tuti
some states (notably California, Texas, and Florida) were expanding
the investment powers of thrifts; and more recently, many states have
entered into regional or reciprocal compacts that have permitted in- Re
terstate purchases and branching of banks and thrifts. Again, these
Ch changes have contributed to the merger wave in these industries.
b
Fel
Summary. It seems clear that, at least for the next few years, these Sal
changed and still-changing conditions will mean a continuing high level n
of mergers. The thrift industry has shrunk from almost 4,800 institutions Sal
(as members of the Federal Home Loan Bank System) in 1970 to ap-
proximately 3,500 today. As of this writing, the FSLIC has a problem
list of approximately 400 insolvent thrifts that are unlikely to survive Wi
by themselves. Merger, in one form or another, is the likely outcome331 Panel Discussion: Corporate Takeovers and Public Policy
in- for most of them. And increased opportunities for interstate purchases
'es and branching will likely mean the merger of many more. This will be
true for the approximately 14,000 commercial banks as well.
In sum, flux and changing opportunities are likely to continue in the
)flS financial services markets, at least for the next few years. And these
es conditions will surely be conducive to a continuing wave of mergers




em I. Further discussion of merger policy and procedures can be found in White
•we (1985)andSalop et al. (1987).
rift 2. As noted earlier in this panel discussion, the DOJ and the FTC share
• responsibility for enforcing the Clayton Act. The division of responsibility for
investigating potential cases is largely arbitrary, with historical expertise in the
industrial or commercial area as the major guiding principle. The DOJ, though,
,uS does have sole responsibility for reviewing mergers in most regulated areas,
ces such as transportation and financial services.
3. In my opinion this was the major conceptual advance achieved by the
the 1982 Guidelines.
)ut 4. It is worth noting that the market definition paradigm focuses primarily
est on a group of sellers, since it is sellers that may exercise market power. If a
group could practice price discrimination toward one group of buyers—say,
ts), buyers in one geographic region—then the paradigm calls for a focus on those
ac- buyers as well.
:ed 5. If one of the merger partners is a likely entrant into one or more of the
the product markets of the other, where entry is difficult and potential entrants are
me scarce, a challenge to the merger might still be forthcoming.
6. For further discussion of this point see Salop and White (1986).
7. Although the FTC is not formally bound by the Guidelines, informal agency
tS practice has been to follow their broad outlines.
if 8. Further discussion of the regulation and deregulation of depository insti-
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